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ABSTRACT 
This report describes a system level study on the use of a swarm of sea gliders to detect, confirm 
and kill littoral submarine threats. The report begins with a description of the problem and derives 
the probability of detecting a constant speed threat without networking. It was concluded that 
glider motion does little to improve this probability unless the speed of a glider is greater than the 
speed of the threat. Therefore, before detection, the optimal character for a swarm of gliders is 
simply to lie in wait for the detection of a threat. The report proceeds by describing the effect of 
noise on the localization of a threat once initial detection is achieved. This noise is estimated as a 
function of threat location relative to the glider and is temporally reduced through the use of an 
information or Kalman filtering. In the next section, the swarm probability of confirming and 
killing a threat is formulated. Results are compared to a collection of stationary sensors. These 
results show that once a glider has the ability to move faster than the threat, the performance of the 
swarm is equal to the performance of a stationary swarm of gliders with confirmation and kill 
ranges equal to detection range. Moreover, at glider speeds greater than the speed of the threat, 
swarm performance becomes a weak function of speed. At these speeds swarm performance is 
dominated by detection range. Therefore, to future enhance swarm performance or to reduce the 
number of gliders required for a given performance, detection range must be increased. 
Communications latency is also examined. It was found that relatively large communication 
delays did little to change swarm performance.  Thus gliders may come to the surface and use 
SATCOMS to effectively communicate in this application.   
This report summarizes work completed for DARPA under Proposal Number 062030407-2 funded 
by MIPR 04-Q104 and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.  
  
4  
Intentionally Left Blank 
  5 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
We would like to thank Khine Latt, the DARPA Program Manager for this project, for the 
opportunity to work on this challenging problem and for her technical guidance and 
support throughout the project.  We would also like to thank Samuel Earp and Edward 
Mihalak for their technical and programmatic suggestions, and Robert Miyamoto, James 
Luby, and Michael Boyd of the University of Washington for their assistance on the range 
of acoustic transmission and glider control. 
 
  
6  
Intentionally Left Blank 
  7 
 
TABLE OF CONTENT 
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................12 
II. DETECTION..........................................................................................................................................14 
III. LOCALIZATION .................................................................................................................................15 
     a Measurement noise...............................................................................................................................16 
     b Information filtering .............................................................................................................................19 
IV. CONFIRMATION AND KILL ............................................................................................................21 
     a A higher level of control .......................................................................................................................21 
     b A lower level of control ........................................................................................................................23 
     c Swarm performance..............................................................................................................................24 
V. CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................................32 
VI. FUTURE WORK ..................................................................................................................................33 
APPENDIX  I: DETECTION RANGE CALCULATION .........................................................................35 
APPENDIX  II: SIMULATION PARAMETERS ......................................................................................41 
APPENDIX  III: LATENCY OF COMMUNICATIONS ..........................................................................43 
  
8  
 
Intentionally Left Blank 
  9 
FIGURES: 
Figure 1: A swarm of sea gliders are used to detect, localize and kill a threat..................................... 13 
Figure 2: The probability of at least one detection by a swarm of gliders with various glider 
speeds. Notice that there is little change in the probability of detection with speed ............................ 15 
Figure 3: A glider and its hydrophones. Acoustic energy from a threat reaches the hydrophones at 
different times. The difference in these arrival times can be used to determine range and bearing..... 16 
Figure 4: Time delays between hydrophones are measured using a cross correlation. ........................ 18 
Figure 5. Range and bearing error can be translated into a local error in a coordinate system 
centered at the location of the threat. This error can be translated into global coordinates.................. 18 
Figure 6: Measurement and prediction of the x location of threat.  black – measurement, grey – 
estimate................................................................................................................................................. 20 
Figure 7: Upper layer of control based on a set of logic rules.............................................................. 22 
Figure 8: Region of approach to confirm and region of approach to kill. ............................................ 23 
Figure 9: (a) Configuration used to run Monte Carlo simulations. (b) Results from Monte Carlo simulations. . 24 
Figure 10: (a) Configuration used to run Monte Carlo simulation. (b) Probability of a kill. (c) 
probability of a confirmation................................................................................................................ 26 
Figure 11: The region of approach is a function of confirmation and/or detection range and 
communication latency......................................................................................................................... 27 
Figure 12: The probability of confirming a threat. ............................................................................... 29 
Figure 13: The probability of killing a threat. ...................................................................................... 30 
Figure 14: The variation in the probability of killing a threat as a function of communication delay. 
The glider has a speed of 1.5 knots. ..................................................................................................... 30 
Figure 15: As the width of sea space is reduced, the affect of communication delay becomes more 
significant. ............................................................................................................................................ 31 
Figure 16: The probability of detecting, confirming and killing a threat as a function of range and 
number of gliders when the gliders can move faster than the threat. ................................................... 29 
Figure 17: Wenz’s illustration of back ground noise in the oceans: For frequencies above 1 kHz, 
noise level are low and are dominated by surface wind speed. ............................................................ 36 
Figure 18: Urick’s combination of data from Wenz, Piggot, and Knudsen: The red line shows the 
equation (49) approximation to NL for sea state 4 between 1 to 10 kHz. ............................................ 36 
Figure 19: Spectrum of a WWII fleet boat running a periscope depth: The red line is the equation 
(50) approximation. .............................................................................................................................. 37 
Figure 20: Detection Threshold as a function of frequency for various ranges from the threat:.......... 38 
Figure 21: Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) for Gaussian noise .......................................... 39 
Figure 22: Communication range between gliders for a network of gliders using over the surface 
RF transmission.................................................................................................................................... 44 
  
10  
Intentionally Left Blank 
  11 
TABLES: 
Table 1: Near- Field anomaly coefficients.....................................................................................37 
Table 2: Attenuation factors...........................................................................................................38 
Table 3: Latency of communication ..............................................................................................45 
  
12  
Intentionally Left Blank 
  13 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we present a system level study on the use of swarms of gliders collectively 
interacting to detect, confirm and kill a littoral submarine threat. Detection implies the initial 
determination of a possible threat in a sea space, called a contact. Once a contact occurs, 
localization is used to estimate the position of that contact. This information is communicated to 
other gliders to determine whether they can confirm and/or whether they are in a position to kill. 
Confirmation implies that a glider can move close enough to the contact to determine its character 
through the use of short range sensors, and killing implies being able to physically intercept the 
threat. In this report, we assumed that contact occurs at an acoustic range of 200 meters (see 
Appendix I for analysis), confirmation occur at 30 meters, and kill occurs at 5 meters.  
A generalized scenario is shown in Figure 1. A lone threat, moving at speed u , enters a 
rectangular sea space L long and L wide. Within this sea space there is a swarm of N gliders where 
the ith glider has bearing 
ig
β  and maximum speed v . All gliders have a detection range of 
200metersR = . Each glider detects the threat through a set of on-board hydrophones, obeys the 
same local control law, and is capable of sharing information with neighboring gliders. This study 
only investigates this two dimensional problem and ignores ocean depth.  Assuming that the depth 
of the ocean is less than the 200 meter detection range, this assumption will not affect the detection 
analysis; however, it will affect the confirmation and kill analysis and future work is needed in this 
area. 
L 
L 
threat moving with 
speed, u  
detection range, R 
glider moving with 
speed, v  
  
ig
β  
 
Figure 1: A swarm of sea gliders are used to detect, localize and kill a threat. 
  
14  
II. DETECTION 
Detection is the process of determining if a contact is within the Figure 1 sea space. The 
probability of the swarm detecting this threat, ( )N dP S , is derived from the probability of detection 
for one glider, 1( )g dP S  where 
{detection of threat}dS = . 
We assume that L = 50 nm and 3knotsu = . Then the detection area A=2500 2nm  and the time 
for a threat to cross A is / 16.7 hoursT L u= ≈ . Using the above relations and expanding upon 
the work of Koopman [1] 
 1
4
( ) ( ) ( )effg d
R T
P S u v E
A
σπ= +  (1) 
where v is the speed of the glider, ( )E σ  is an elliptic integral of the second kind, 2sin uv
u v
σ = + , 
and effR  is an effective radius used to account for the sensor integration time, intT , that the threat 
must be within the detection radius, R, before a contact can be declared. From the work of 
Wettergren [3], the effective radius for a stationary glider is 
 2 2int( / 2)effR R uT= − . (2) 
If there are n gliders and if each behaves independently, then the probability of k gliders within the 
swarm detecting the threat is given by 
 1 1
!( ) ( ) (1 ( ))
!( )!
k n k
N d g d g d
nP S k P S P S
k n k
−= = −−  (3) 
and the probability of greater than k detections is given by 
 
0
( ) (1 ( ))
k
N d N d
m
P S k P S m
=
> = − =∑ . (4) 
Figure 2 is a plot of equation (4) for k=0 (at least one detection), int 25secondsT = , v=0 knots, 
v=0.5 knots, v=1.5 knots, and v=3.0 knots. Notice, as stated by Earp [4], motion does little to 
improve the probability of detection for a glider moving slower than or close to the speed of the 
threat.  
This is an important conclusion. If motion does little to improve the detection of a threat, then any 
motion by the swarm prior to detection only uses energy unproductively. Therefore, we envision 
that in the detection stage, the swarm simply lies in wait, communicating infrequently, using as 
little energy as possible. When a contact is made, information is communicated to a neighborhood 
of gliders and the process of localization and confirmation begins. 
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Figure 2: The probability of at least one detection by a swarm of gliders with various glider speeds. 
Notice that there is little change in the probability of detection with speed. 
In the above section, we determined the probability of detecting a threat using derivations from 
Koopman. Results from this analysis showed that motion during the detection phase does little to 
improve the probability of detection. Nevertheless, as will be seen, motion significantly improves 
the ability for a swarm to localize, confirm or kill a threat. In section IV, we will derive the 
probability of a swarm of gliders confirming or killing a threat by expanding upon (1); however, to 
do so, we will needed to use a modified derivation of this equation based upon disjoint events.  
If 0v = , then  from equation (1),  
 1
2( )g d
RuTP S
A
=  (5) 
where 2RuT  is the area of the shaded rectangle in Figure 1. Noticing that the probability of 
detecting the threat in the time range [ ],t t dt+  is given by 
 [ ]1 2( , , )g d RudtdP S t t dt A+ =  (6) 
and that this is disjoint from the probability of detecting the threat within any other time range of 
length dt. Thus, we can rewrite equation (1) as 
 1 1
0
( ) ( ,[ , ])
T
g d gP S dP D t t dt= +∫ . (7) 
Substituting (6) into (7) gives (5). Equation (6) and (7) will be revisited in section IV. 
III. LOCALIZATION 
As stated above, motion does little to improve the detection capability of the swarm. Nevertheless, 
once a contact is made, motion significantly improves localization, confirmation and kill.  
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Figure 3: A glider and its hydrophones. Acoustic energy from a threat reaches the hydrophones at 
different times. The difference in these arrival times can be used to determine range and bearing. 
Any model that is used to predict the effect of motion on the ability of a swarm to localize, 
confirm, and kill a threat must include a representation of measurement noise. In the following, we 
present one method of estimating the location of a threat from a set of sensors on the glider by 
measuring time delays between sensors. We then show how errors in these time delays translate to 
a positioning error relative to the coordinate system of the glider. This positioning error can then 
be translated into a global positioning error that can be used to drive an information filter. 
Information filters are used to estimate the location and speed of the threat in the presence of 
measurement noise. 
a Measurement noise 
A swarm of gliders attempts to discern a contact in the presence of noise. If it were not for noise, 
the process of confirming and localizing a threat would be trivial. Therefore, in any system level 
study, noise must be included. We assume that a glider contains a set of three hydrophones located 
about a central hydrophone (see Figure 3). Acoustic energy from a contact reaches these 
hydrophones at different times. The difference in arrival times between the central hydrophone and 
the ith hydrophone is given by iτ . Following the work of Huang, Benesty and Elko [5], these time 
differences can be used to estimate the location of a contact. A local coordinate system is defined 
with its origin at the central hydrophone and with the x  axis along the length of the glider. 
Relative to this system, the vector between the central hydrophone and the ith hydrophone is given 
by ( , )i i ir x y=r  where i ir R=r  is distance. The distance from the contact to the ith hydrophone is 
given by iD , and the distance from the contact to the central hydrophone is given by s sr R=r  
where ( , )s s sr x y=r . From Huang, Benesty and Elko, 
 A bθ = rr  (8) 
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where 
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 3
x y c
A x y c
x y c
τ
τ
τ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, 
( )
( )
( )
22
1 1
22
2 2
32
3 3
1
2
R c
b R c
R c
τ
τ
τ
⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= −⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
r
, and ˆ ˆ[ , , ]
T T
s s sx y Rθ =
r
 is the measurement of 
the location and distance of the contact relative to the local coordinate system of the glider. For 
contacts at the edge of the detection range, these measurements are highly corrupted by noise. 
Assuming that time delay estimates, iτ , are uncorrelated and that all statistics are Gaussian, the 
variance of these measurements can be approximated as 
 
1 13
2 2
1
( ( ) ( ) ) T T
( ) ( )
T
T T
i
i i i
A b A bE E E
c c
σ θ θ θ θ στ τ
− −
=
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤∂ ∂⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟′ ′ ′ ′= − − = ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
∑r r r r  (9) 
where ˆ ˆ[ , ]T Ts sx yθ ′ =
r
, 
1 0 0
T
0 1 0
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , and [ ]
22 ( ( ) )i i iE Eσ τ τ= − . 
If measurements are ergodic, iτ can be estimated using the process shown in Figure 4 where iτσ  
is the variance of iτ . Pressure time histories are measured at the ith and central hydrophones, band 
passed filtered between frequencies 1f  and 2f , summed and integrated over time. Quazi [7] 
shows that if the signal to noise ratio, SNR, between 1f  and 2f  is constant, and 1SNR <<  then  
 
int
1 1 1 1
2 2i rmsf SNRT W
τσ π≈  (10) 
where 2 1W f f≡ − , ( )2 201 /12rms of f W f= +  and 1 2/ 2 / 2of f W f W≡ + = − . For 
1SNR >>  
 
int
1 1 1 1
2i rmsfT W SNR
τσ π≈ . (11) 
As the threat moves closer to the glider, SNR increases and 
iτσ  becomes small. As it moves 
farther away, the opposite occurs. Assuming that variations in SNR are dominated by two 
dimensional acoustic spreading, if d  is the distance between the glider and the contact and RSNR  
is the signal to noise ratio at detection range, R, then 
 R
dSNR SNR
R
≈ ⋅ . (12) 
where RSNR  and R are determined from the sonar equation (see Appendix I). 
  
18  
signal from the 
central hydrophone 
signal from the 
ith hydrophone bandpass 
filters  
( )H ω  
( )H ω  
int
int
1 T
o
dt
T
ξ∫  
time 
  ,i jτ  ξ  
 
Figure 4: Time delays between hydrophones are measured using a cross correlation. 
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Figure 5. Range and bearing error can be translated into a local error in a coordinate system centered 
at the location of the threat. This error can be translated into global coordinates. 
From the above equations a statistical estimate of the location of the threat relative to the local 
coordinate system of the glider can be made. Knowing the orientation and location of its own local 
coordinate system, a glider can translate these measurements into global coordinates (see Figure 
5). If ( ),t tx y  is the true location of the contact in glider coordinates and ˆt s tx x xδ ′ = −  and 
ˆt s ty y yδ ′ = −  are the deviations of glider measurements from their true values in this same 
coordinate system, then the deviation of these measurements in global coordinates is given by 
 t t
t t
x x
v G
y y
δ δ
δ δ
′⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥′⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
r
 (13) 
where 
sin( ) cos( )
cos( ) sin( )
G
β θ β θ
β θ β θ
− − −⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦ . Thus, assuming white noise, a sampled correlation 
matrix for measurement noise in global coordinates is given by 
 ( ( ) ( ))T T ijR E v i v i j G Gσ δ= − =r r  (14) 
where ijδ  is a Kronecker delta function, vr  is measurement noise, and σ  is defined in (9). In the 
following, we will use this measurement noise as input to an information filter for the purpose of 
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localizing a contact. This localization process occurs in a global coordinate system utilized by all 
gliders. 
b Information filtering 
Information filters [8] are used to share state predictions and to temporally minimize measurement 
noise. These filters, running in parallel, produce the same results as if measurements from all 
gliders were combined into a single Kalman [9] filter or as if identical Kalman filters were run in 
parallel and then fused [10]. Nevertheless, in general, the computational cost of using a Kalman 
filter is greater than that of using an information filter when several measurements are being 
processed at that same time and therefore, information filtering is presented here. 
The information filter like the Kalman filter uses a mathematical model of the dynamics of a 
contact to estimate its state. This state can be used to determine the location and bearing of a 
contact. We assume that the contact has discrete-time dynamics that can be fit to the model 
 ( ) ( 1) ( 1)x k F x k w k= − + −r r r  (15) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )z k H x k v k= +r rr  (16) 
where ( ) [ , , , ]
t t
T
t t x yx k x y u u=r , ( tx , ty ) is the global location of the contact, costx tu u β=  is the 
velocity of the contact along the x axis, sin
ty t
u u β=  is the velocity of the contact along the y 
axis,  
 
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
T
T
F
∆⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥∆⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, (17) 
 
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
H ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , (18) 
4 1( )w k ×∈ℜr  is the state noise with covariance 4 4Q ×∈ℜ , 2 1( )z k ×∈ℜr  is the sensor measurement, 
and 2 1( ) xv k ∈ℜr  is the measurement noise with statistics as defined in (14). The state noise, 
( )w kr , is due to forces on the threat that produce a change of its position with time whereas the 
noise ( )v kr  represents noise introduced into measurements as described above. Considering the 
size and mass of a threat, we assume that ( )w kr  is insignificant compared to ( )v kr . Therefore, we 
set 0Q c I=  where 0 0c ≈  is a small number and I  is the identity matrix. 
The information filter for the ith glider consists of a prediction and estimation step. The local 
prediction step is  
 1ˆ ˆ( 1) ( 1) ( 1 1) ( 1 1)i i i iy k k Y k k F Y k k y k k
−− = − − − − −r r  (19) 
 
1
1( 1) ( 1 1) Ti iY k k F Y k k F Q
−−⎡ ⎤− = − − +⎣ ⎦  (20) 
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where ˆ ( 1)iy k k −r  is the prediction of the information vector, ( 1)iY k k −  is the prediction of the 
information matrix, ˆ ( 1 1)iy k k− −r  is the previous estimate of the information vector, and 
( 1 1)iY k k− −  is the previous estimate of the information matrix. The information vector and 
matrix are related to the state vector and its covariance by 
 ( ) 1ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i iE x k x k Y k k y k k−= =r r r  (21) 
 ( )( ) 1( ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ) ( ) ( | )T iE x k E x k x k E x k P k Y k k−− − = =r r r r  (22) 
where ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) [ , , , ]
t t
T
t t x yx k x y u u=r and ˆtx  is the estimate of tx . 
The estimation step is  
 1ˆ ˆ( | ) ( | 1) ( ) ( )Ti i j j
j NN
y k k y k k H R k z k−
∈
= − + ∑r r r  (23) 
 1( | ) ( | 1) ( )Ti i j j
j NN
Y k k Y k k H R k H−
∈
= − + ∑  (24) 
where NN refers to the set of nearest neighbor gliders that have detected the threat at time step k 
and can communicate with the ith glider. 
Using equation (8) through (24), MATLAB, simulations of a threat moving past a stationary glider 
were produced (see Appendix II for parameters). Figure 6 shows the measurement and estimate of 
the x location of the threat (in global coordinates) by the glider. Notice that initially measurement 
error is very large; however as the threat moves past the glider, the range to the glider is reduced 
and SNR is enhanced. The estimate from the information filter improves, but with less variation. 
As the threat passes and the distance between the threat and the glider increases, SNR is reduced 
and variations in the measurement increase. Nevertheless, variations in the estimate are still small. 
 
Initial 
detection 
of threat 
SNR is 
increased due 
to proximity of 
threat 
SNR reduced 
as proximity 
is increased 
Estimate 
deviates little 
from true value 
Stationary 
Glider 
Threat traveling 
with a speed of 3 
knots 
x 
Detection range, 
R=200 m 
y 
 
Figure 6: Measurement and prediction of the x location of threat.  black – measurement, grey – 
estimate. 
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IV. CONFIRMATION AND KILL 
As stated above, an information filter is simply a Kalman filter solved in a computationally 
efficient fashion and a Kalman filter is a dynamic filter used to reduce measurement noise based 
upon a model of threat dynamics. The result is a low noise estimate of the location of a contact. 
From this, a glider can estimate its ability to confirm or kill. Nevertheless, Kalman filtering is not 
perfect and due to the presence of residual noise, the probability of confirming or killing is 
probabilistic.  
a A higher level of control 
As shown in Figure 7, as a glider moves through the water, it asks itself a number of questions and 
based upon its response, it modifies its actions accordingly. This process begins with an interrupt 
that down-loads information about the location and type of a contact. The glider evaluates this data 
and acts upon its evaluation. For example, if the glider receives information that there is a 
confirmed threat, but deduces that it cannot kill this threat, there is no reason for it to move since 
additional motion will not add any information to the swarm. However, if it determines that it can 
kill the threat, it acts appropriately by moving. As the glider moves it evaluates the quality of its 
contact and whether or not it has the ability to kill. When it determines that it can no longer 
increase the level of information in the swarm, it breaks from pursuit and transfers any additional 
information to its neighbors. Other gliders receive this information and the process is begins again.  
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Figure 7: Upper layer of control based on a set of logic rules. 
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Figure 8: Region of approach to confirm and region of approach to kill.  
The algorithm used to determine if a glider can confirm or kill a threat is an extension of the work 
of Koopman [1].  A glider can intercept the center of the threat if it lies within the region of 
approach. This region is defined by a cone extending from the threat to areas with an arch from 
1sin v
u
− ⎛ ⎞− ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  to 
1sin v
u
− ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  from it direction of motion as shown in Figure 8. The apex of this cone 
is at the center of the threat. The region of approach to confirm or kill is given by the union of the 
orange and the blue areas in Figure 8 and includes a cone between 1sin v
u
− ⎛ ⎞− ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  to 
1sin v
u
− ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  with 
apex at Point A at a distance D behind the location of the threat where 
 
uD r
v
= . (25) 
and 30metersr =  for confirmation and 5metersr =  to kill. 
b A lower level of control 
Figure 5 shows the location of the threat relative to the glider after detection. The shortest time to 
intercept can be calculated to be 
 2 2 22 2
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( cos( ) sin ( )
ˆ
dt u v u
u v
α α= ⋅ − − ⋅−  (26) 
where dˆ  is the distance between the glider and the contact, 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆx yu u u= +  is the speed of the 
threat, v  is the speed of the glider, αˆ  is calculated from threat bearing and location and variables 
with hats represent estimates from the information filter. From this equation comes the condition 
that the glider will intercept the target only if  
 D 
 r 
1sin v
u
− ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
A glider in the 
orange area can 
reach area A, 
but cannot 
intercept the 
center of the 
threat. 
A glider in the blue area 
can reach area A, and can 
intercept the center of the 
threat. 
A glider in the red 
area cannot reach 
area A, and cannot 
intercept. 
Area A 
1sin v
u
− ⎛ ⎞− ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Point O 
Point A 
α  
β  
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 1ˆ sin
ˆ
v
u
α − ⎛ ⎞< ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . (27) 
If this condition is satisfied, the glider must move in the direction  
 1
ˆ ˆsin sin( )u
v
θ α− ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (28) 
to intercept the threat in the shortest time. Equations (28) represent a simple control law for 
directing a glider to a threat with limited knowledge of threat dynamics. 
c Swarm performance 
A glider that makes contact can confirm or kill that contact one of two ways – it can confirm or 
kill it without help from any other glider, or it can confirm or kill by communicating with the other 
gliders and allowing another glider to do the confirming or killing for it. In this section we develop 
the probability of a glider confirming or killing without and with the aid of the rest of the gliders, 
combine these to determine the probability of a glider of confirming or killing, and then use this 
result to deduce the probability of the swarm confirming or killing.  In the derivation below, we 
assume that the range of communication of each glider is enough that every glider can 
communication with any other glider in the 50x50 nautical mile box.  We also assume that the 
gliders know their position, mostly likely via GPS. 
Figure 9a shows the condition where the glider that detects the threat confirms or kills it. In this 
figure, a glider is a standoff distance χ  away from a threat. As the threat passes, the glider detects 
it and moves to confirm and/or kill using the local control scheme given by equation (28), the 
information filter given by equations (15) through (24), and an approximation of noise given by 
equations (9) through (14). These simulations were run using the parameters given in Appendix II.  
Monte Carlo simulations were run to determine the conditional probability of confirming or killing 
the threat as a function of χ  given detection. Figure 9b shows these functions. 
(b) 
 Stand-off distance, χ  (meters) 
(a) 
Threat  
x 
y 
Stand-off 
distance χ  
First Glider Probability of Confirming or Killing given Detection 
Figure 9: (a) Configuration used to run Monte Carlo simulations. (b) Results from Monte Carlo 
simulations. 
The conditional probability functions in Figure 9b can be approximated by 
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2
1
1 1 for 0 14
( | ) 200 14
0 for 14< <200
g k df S S
χ χ
χ
⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− < <⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎝ ⎠⎨ ⎝ ⎠⎪⎩
, (29) 
 
90
1
1 1 for 0 40
( | ) 200 40
0 for 40< <200
g c df S S
χ χ
χ
⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− < <⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎝ ⎠⎨ ⎝ ⎠⎪⎩
 (30) 
where  
{ }theglider kills the threatkS =  
{theglider confirms the threat}cS = . 
From (29) and (30) the probability of killing and confirming the threat, given that the threat is 
detected is given by 
 1 1
0
( | ) ( | ) 0.047
R
g k d g k dP S S f S S d χ= =∫ , (31) 
 1 1
0
( | ) ( | ) 0.237
R
g c d g c dP S S f S S d χ= =∫ , (32) 
where R is detection range. In comparison, if the glider could not move, 
1
5( | ) 0.025
200g k d
r metersP S S
r meters
== ==  and 1
30( | ) 0.15
200g c d
r metersP S S
r meters
== ==  which are 
values significantly less then those given in (31) and (32). Thus, motion improves the ability of 
even a single glider to confirm and/or kill once detection occurs. 
Figure 10 shows the condition where the glider that detects the threat communications with the rest 
of the swarm so that another glider can confirm or kill. This figure is similar to the Figure 9 system 
with a second glider in the region of approach at angle β  and at a stand-off distance q . The first 
glider is assumed to be stationary. As the threat passes, the first glider transmits its information 
vector and matrix to the second glider. The second glider uses this information to attempt to 
confirm and/or kill.  
Monte Carlo simulations were run to determine the probability of the second glider confirming 
and/or killing the threat given that detection occurred due to an initial glider located 75 meters in 
the x direction from threat. The probability of the second glider confirming or killing is plotted in 
Figure 10b and c as a function of position.  
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(b) 
 
(c)  
 
(radians)β  
(radians)β  
Stand-off 
distance 
(meters) 
Stand-off 
distance 
(meters) 
Probability of Killing the Threat as a Function of Location
Maximum glider speed of 0.5 knots 
Probability of Confirming the Threat as a Function of Location
Maximum glider speed of 0.5 knots 
(a) 
Second 
Glider
Threat  
x 
y 
Region of approach 
β  
Point A 
Stand-off 
distance 
First Glider
(stationary)
The first glider detects the threat and starts its 
information filter. It is assumed to be stationary. The 
threat moves as close as 75 meters from this glider 
and then moves outside its range of detection. The 
first glider transfers information filter data to the 
second glider and the second glider attempts to 
confirm or kill.  
One hundred simulations were run for each point in a 
7 by 61 grid of points in β  and stand-off distance. 
Results were averaged and curved fit. The curve 
fitted results are shown in (a) and (b). 
Figure 10: (a) Configuration used to run Monte Carlo simulation. (b) Probability of a kill. (c) 
probability of a confirmation. 
From simulations, the below approximations can be made 
 ( ) ( )
2( )
max max
2 max
1 for and
( | , )
0
q D
g k
e D
P S q
otherwise
ρ
λβ β β β ρβ β
− ⋅ −⎧⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪⎪ − − ≤ ≤ < < ∞⎪⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟= ⎨ ⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭⎪⎪⎩
 (33) 
for 2ρ =  and 0.0018λ =  and  
 ( ) ( )
2( )
max max
2 max
1 for and
( | , )
0
q D
g c
e D
P S q
otherwise
ρ
λβ β β β ρβ β
− ⋅ −⎧⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪⎪ − − ≤ ≤ < < ∞⎪⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟= ⎨ ⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭⎪⎪⎩
 (34) 
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for 20ρ =  and 0.0006λ = , where β  is in radians and 1max sin vuβ
−= . 
L 
L 
Point A 
(see figure 7) 
Location of threat after 
communication 
1sin
v
u
− ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
( )comL u t Dτ− ⋅ + +  
approachA , the 
region of 
approach after 
communication 
latency 
β  
γ
q
ν
 
Figure 11: The region of approach is a function of confirmation and/or detection range and 
communication latency. The effect of a communications delay is to move the region of approach 
forward. 
The probability of confirming a threat via communications to a second glider given detection 
within any time interval [ ],t t dt+  by the first glider is a function of D  (see equation (25)) and of 
the latency of communications, comτ . An analysis of the latency of communications is given in 
Appendix III. As shown in Figure 11, the region of approach is bounded by the sea space shown in 
Figure 1. Assuming that the information statistics change little with the distance at which contact 
is made by the first glider, the probability of the second glider confirming a threat is given by 
 ( )2 21( | ,[ , ]) ( | , )
approach
g c d g c
A
P S S t t dt P S q d d
A
β ν ν γ+ = ⋅ ⋅∫ . (35) 
where distance ν  and angle γ  are as shown in Figure 11, approachA  is that part of the region of 
approach within A with height ( )coml L u t Dτ= − ⋅ + +  
 ( ) ( )2 2cos sincomq uν γ τ ν γ= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  (36) 
and 
 1
coscos comu
q
ν γ τβ − ⎛ ⎞⋅ + ⋅= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . (37) 
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For the situation where maxβ  is small (i.e. the gliders are much slower than the threat), using 
equation (34), equation (35) can be approximated by  
 
2 2( )max
2 ( | ,[ , ]) 1
com
l
u D
g c d
D
P S S t t dt e d
A
λ ν τβ ρ ν νρ
− + ⋅ −+ = ⋅+ ∫ . (38) 
Therefore, the probability that k secondary gliders will confirm the threat after communicating 
with the first glider is given by  
2 2
!( | ,[ , ]) ( | ,[ , ]) (1 ( | ,[ , ]))
!( )!
k n k
N c d g c d g c d
nP S k S t t dt P S S t t dt P S S t t dt
k n k
−= + = + − +−  (39) 
and therefore, the probability that at least one secondary glider will confirm the threat after 
communicating with the first glider is given by 
 ( 0 | ,[ , ]) 1 ( 0 | ,[ , ])N c d N c dP S S t t dt P S S t t dt> + = − = + . (40) 
Thus, using results from Section II, from (7), the probability of the first glider confirming a threat 
by communicating with the rest of the swarm is given by 
 [ ]1 1
0
( ) ( 0 | , , ) ( ,[ , ])
T
g cN N c d g dP S P S S t t dt dP S t t dt= > + ⋅ +∫  (41) 
where 
{a glider confirms the threat bycommunicating with other gliders}cNS =  
and 1( ,[ , ])g ddP S t t dt+  is defined by equation (6) in section II. 
A similar solution can be derived for 1( )g kNP S  where  
{a glider kills the threat bycommunicating with other gliders}kNS = . 
Equation (32) is the probability of the first glider confirming the threat that it initially detected, 
and equation (41) is the probability of the first glider communicating with a second glider that 
confirms the threat given detection by the first glider. Thus, the probability that a single glider will 
confirm and/or kill the threat by communicating with the rest of the swarm or on its own is given 
by 
 ( )1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( | ) ( ) 1 ( | ) ( ) ( )g c g c d g d g c d g d g cNP S P S S P S P S S P S P S= ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ . (42) 
 ( )1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( | ) ( ) 1 ( | ) ( ) ( )g k g k d g d g k d g d g kNP S P S S P S P S S P S P S= ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅  (43) 
where 1( )g dP S  is given by equation (5). 
Thus, the probability that k gliders will confirm and/or kill the threat by communicating or on their 
own is given by 
 1 1
!( ) ( ) (1 ( ))
!( )!
k n k
N c g c g c
nP S k P S P S
k n k
−= = −− , (44) 
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 1 1
!( ) ( ) (1 ( ))
!( )!
k n k
N k g k g k
nP S k P S P S
k n k
−= = −− , (45) 
and the probability that at least one glider will confirm or kill the threat by communicating on its 
own is given by 
 ( ) 1 ( 0)N cN N cP S P S= − = , (46) 
 ( ) 1 ( 0)N kN N kP S P S= − = . (47) 
Equations (46) and (47) represent the probability of a swarm of gliders to confirm or kill a threat. 
This probability can be compared to the probability of a distribution of stationary sensors 
confirming or killing the threat. For a non moving set of sensors, equations (3) through (5) are 
used with r= 30 meters, the confirmation range. For the limiting case when glider speed is great 
than the speed of the threat confirmation and kill occurs for any detection. This can be represented 
by using equations (3) through (5) with r=R. 
 
Figure 12: The probability of confirming a threat. 
Figure 12 shows the probability of confirming a threat for a glider with speed 0.5 knots, 1.5 knot 
and any speed greater than the speed of the threat (3.0 knots). Figure 13 shows the same 
information for killing the threat. 
  
30  
 
Figure 13: The probability of killing a threat. 
Appendix III contains an analysis of communication latency. This is the time between when a 
glider detects a possible threat and the time this information is received by another glider. As 
discussed above this affects the probability of confirming or killing a threat; however, its affect is 
not as strong as might be expected. Figure 14 shows variations in the probability of confirming a 
threat as a function of communication latency. Notice that unless latency is on the order of hours, 
its effect is relatively weak.  As pointed out in Appendix III, the typical latency to surface from a 
200 meter depth will be less than 15 minutes. To maintain a probability of confirmation of 0.9, this 
15 minute latency would reduce the performance of the swarm very little.  
 
Figure 14: The variation in the probability of killing a threat as a function of communication delay. 
The glider has a speed of 1.5 knots. 
If the width of the box shown in Figure 1 is reduced, the scenario approaches that of a barrier and 
the effects of time delay become more significant. Figure 15 shows the probability of confirming a 
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threat as a function of the number of gliders for a 1 hour communication delay and for various sea 
space widths. As the width of the sea space is reduced the number of glider required to produce the 
same probability of confirmation must increase since the size of the region of approach shown in 
Figure 11 (blue triangle) is reduced. When the width of the box is reduced to the point where the 
region of approach contains no area, the number of gliders must go to infinity. This occurs for the 
scenario in Figure 15 when the width is about 3.0 nm. 
 
Figure 15: As the width of sea space is reduced, the affect of communication delay becomes more 
significant. 
From Figure 12 and Figure 13 for glider speeds above the speed of the threat, the probability of 
confirming or killing the threat are the same. Therefore, to reduce the number of gliders needed to 
detect, confirm and kill a threat, the detection range needs to be increase. Figure 15 shows the 
probability of detecting, confirming and killing the threat as a function of range and number of 
gliders for a glider moving faster than the threat. Notice that to obtain a 90% probability of 
detecting, confirming and killing the threat using only 40 to 50 gliders, a 2400 meter range is 
required. 
W 
L 
As the width of the sea 
space is reduced, the 
scenario approaches a 
barrier and the effect of 
communication delay 
becomes more pronounced.  
Width of sea space 
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Figure 16: The probability of detecting, confirming and killing a threat as a function of range and 
number of gliders when the gliders can move faster than the threat. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
From the above analysis, a number of conclusions can be drawn. 
In Section II, it was determined that unless a glider can move much faster than the threat, the 
probability of initially detecting a threat is not a strong function of glider speed. Therefore, in the 
detection stage, it is best if gliders simply lie in wait for a threat. Once a threat is detected, 
information is passed to the rest of the swarm and gliders move to reduce their range for the 
purpose of confirming and/or killing the threat. Confirmation implies that the glider can move 
close enough to the threat that the threat can be characterized, and killing implies that the glider 
can intercept the threat.  
Although motion does little to increase the probability of detecting the threat, it significantly 
improves the probability of confirmation and kill. Nevertheless, the range of improvement is 
bounded. Theory was developed to determine the effect of motion on confirming or killing a 
threat. This showed that as glider speed increases, this probability increases from the probability of 
a stationary sensor with detection range equal to the range required to confirm or kill to the 
probability of a stationary sensor where the range to confirm or kill has been equated to the 
detection range. Moreover, when the speed of the glider reaches the speed of the threat, the 
probability of detecting, confirming, and killing become equal. At this point, further enhancing the 
speed of the glider does little to improve it performance. To future improve performance or to 
reduce the number of gliders required, detection range must be increased. For example, in the case 
of acoustic detection with range of 200 meters, it takes about 600 gliders to produce a 90% 
probability of detection, confirmation and kill. On the other hand, if the detection range were 
increased to 2400 meters, only 50 gliders would be required. 
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Communication latency was also studied. As is shown in Figure 14, communication latency on the 
order of one hour or less has a near negligible effect on performance when guarding a 50x50 
nautical mile box. Therefore, methods of communication such as SATCOM, with longer latencies 
caused by the need to surface to communicate, will not significantly affect system performance. 
VI. FUTURE WORK 
Future work in the analysis of a swarm of glider should include reanalysis for a three dimensional 
problem, an analysis of the tradeoff between enhance detection range and energy consumption, a 
better understanding of how variations in glider distributions can affect swarm performance, an 
understanding of the effect of errors in glider location on swarm performance and an analysis of 
countermeasures against the swarm. 
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APPENDIX  I: DETECTION RANGE CALCULATION 
Detection range is a key factor in determining the cost and capability of a sensor network. It is 
determined by the level of noise in the environment, the strength of the signal from the threat, the 
transmission of that signal through the water, and the ability for the detection system to enhance 
signal levels while rejecting noise. This can be summarized by the passive sonar equation1 
 - -DT SL TL NL DI= +  (48) 
where  
DT is the Detection Threshold, the signal power across the bandwidth of detection 
normalized by the noise power in a one Hertz band;  
NL is the background Noise Level of the ocean normalized by a reference pressure; 
SL is the Source Level, the power of the signal emitted by the threat normalized to 
one yard from the geometric center of the threat and by a standard reference 
pressure; 
TL is the Transmission Loss, the ratio of the received power of the signal at 
normalized by the power of the signal transmitted; and 
DI is the Directivity Index, the ratio of the signal to noise of the array normalized by 
the signal to noise of a single element of that array. 
Here we discuss each term on the right hand side of this equation for the purpose of determining 
DT as a function of distance from the threat. 
Figure 17 is a copy of Wenz’s illustration of noise in the oceans2. Wenz not only shows noise from 
various sources but also shows the limits of prevailing noise. Below 1 kHz prevailing noise levels 
are substantial; however above 1 kHz, this noise is reduced and is a function of predominately 
surface wind speeds. For this reason, we limit our frequency range of interest to above 1 kHz. We 
also assume that the wind speeds of interested are below 20 knots, giving a maximum Beaufort 
number of 5 or a Sea State of about 4. We will also limit our maximum frequency of detection to 
below 10 kHz.  
Urick combined Wenz’s, Piggot’s and Knudsen’s data to produce Figure 18. Between 1 to 10 kHz, 
we can approximate NL by 
 = -15log( ) +115dBNL f . (49) 
Since the source levels of most threats are classified, we will use older data found in the open 
literature. Figure 19 shows the source level for a WWII fleet boat running a periscope depth. An 
approximation to this level in the frequency range of interest is given by 
 =-20log( )+176dBSL f . (50) 
                                                     
1 R.J. Urick, Principles of Underwater Sound/ 3d edition, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1983. 
2 G.M. Wenz, “Acoustic Ambient Noise in the Ocean: Spectra and Sources,” Journal of the Acoustical 
Society of America, vol. 34, no. 12, December 1962 
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Figure 17: Wenz’s illustration of back ground noise in the oceans: For frequencies above 1 kHz, noise 
level are low and are dominated by surface wind speed. 
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Figure 18: Urick’s combination of data from Wenz, Piggot, and Knudsen: The red line shows the 
equation (49) approximation to NL for sea state 4 between 1 to 10 kHz. 
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Figure 19: Spectrum of a WWII fleet boat running a periscope depth: The red line is the equation (50) 
approximation. 
Transmission loss in the littoral can be found from the approximations of Marsh and Schulkin3. 
Marsh and Schulkin present the following three equations for the approximation of transmission 
loss at different distances, r, from the threat. 
 10For : 20log ( ) 60 Lr H TL r r kα< = + + −  (51) 
 10 10for 8 : 15log ( ) 1 5log 60T L
rH r H TL r r a H k
H
α ⎛ ⎞≤ ≤ = + + − + + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (52) 
 10 108 : 10 log ( ) 1 10 log 64.5T L
rr H TL r r a H k
H
α ⎛ ⎞> = + + − + + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (53) 
where ( ) 1218H D L⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦ , D is the depth of the littoral, L is the depth of any layer, α is the 
attenuation of the surrounding water in dB per kiloyards, and Lk  and Ta  are given in the 
following tables. 
frequency (Hz) 
Lk  for a sand bottom Lk  for a mud bottom 
1000 4.1 3.7 
2000 3.5 3.1 
4000 2.9 2.4 
8000 2.3 1.9 
10000 2.2 1.7 
Table 1: Near- Field anomaly coefficients. 
 
                                                     
3 H.W. Marsh, M. Schulkin, “Shallow Water Transmission,” Journal of Acoustical Society of America, vol. 
34, pp. 863, 1962. 
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frequency (Hz) 
Ta  for a sand bottom Ta  for a mud bottom 
1000 2.9 4.1 
2000 3.5 5.0 
4000 4.1 6.2 
8000 5.0 7.3 
10000 5.2 7.8 
Table 2: Attenuation factors. 
The value of α  can be approximated between 1 to 10 kHz by 
 
2
2
2
0.1
1000= +0.008
1000
1+
1000
f
f
f
α
⎛ ⎞⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠ ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (54) 
where f is in Hertz. 
The directivity index, DI, is the ratio of the signal to noise of an array of sensors to the signal to 
noise of a single element. Here, we assume the DI~5. 
Using the above data, equation (48) can be solved for DT. Figure 20 shows the value of DT versus 
frequency for various ranges, R. 
 
Figure 20: Detection Threshold as a function of frequency for various ranges from the threat: 
We assume power law detection as shown below. Signal energy is band pass filtered, squared, and 
time integrated for time T. An optimal threshold is then watched to declare detection. Peterson, 
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Birdsall, and Fox4 relate the optimal parameters for this detection scenario to DT. For low signal to 
noise ratios 
 5 log dDT
t
ω=  (55) 
where d is the detection index, ω  is the bandwidth (in Hz), and t is the duration of the signal (here 
t=T). The detection index is obtained from the receiver operating characteristics curve (ROC). A 
ROC curve for Gaussian noise is shown in Figure 21. If we assume that a 1% probability of false 
alarm is acceptable for a 50% probability of detection, then d=6. Moreover, for a 200 meters 
detection range and a center frequency of 1 kHz, DT=7. Assuming a 100 Hz band pass filter, from 
equation (55), the integration time must be 24secondst T= = . 
 
Figure 21: Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) for Gaussian noise. 
 
                                                     
4 W.W. Peterson, T.G. Birdsall, W.C. Fox, “The Theory of Signal Detectability,” Transactions of IRE, 
PGIT-4, pp 171, 1954. 
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APPENDIX  II: SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
The below table contains parameters used to produce Figure 6, Figure 9 and Figure 10. 
Simulation Parameter Description 
R= 200 m Detection range 
iR = 1 m Distance between hydrophones on glider. With respect to the local coordinate system of the 
glider, hydrophones are located at 
( )
1 1
( , ) 1, 0 mx y = , ( )
2 2
( , ) 0, 1 mx y = − , and 
( )
3 3
( , ) 0,1 mx y = . 
c=1500 m/s Speed of sound in water 
int 25secondsT =  Integration time used to calculate time delays. 
of =500 Hz Center frequency used to calculate time delays. 
W= 1000 Hz Band width 
RSNR =7 Signal to noise ratio at detection range 
T∆ =0.2 s Sampling time 
u =3 knots Speed of threat 
v =0.5 knots Speed of glider unless stated otherwise 
81 10oc
−= ⋅  Coefficient used to define noise, w  
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APPENDIX  III: LATENCY OF COMMUNICATIONS 
Satellite Communications, SATCOM: 
There are a number of Low Earth Orbiting (LEO) systems than can be used for SATCOM 
communications; however, due to its ubiquitous presence and low orbital distance, the Iridium 
system is emphasized here. This system is nationally owned, containing 66 satellites at an altitude 
of 785 km. There is always an Iridium satellite at least within 8 degrees from the horizon at any 
location on the earth. The system uses the L band (1.6 GHz, 0.2 meter wavelength) for uploading 
and downloading data with bit rates up to 2.4 kbps. Only about 2 W of transmit power are required 
to reach an Iridium satellite. 
Once a glider is on the surface, a SATCOM system can transmit information very quickly. 
Assuming a six by six information matrix and a six by one information vector comprised of 32 bit 
words about 1400 bits of information need to be communicated to update the location of a threat. 
This is the minimum amount of data to be transmitted not including bits for the preamble, message 
header, id number, time stamp and location. At 2 kbps this takes 0.7 seconds and at 2 watts of 
power, only 1.4 J of energy. 
A limitation to the use of the Iridium system is its dying orbit. 
Over-the-Horizon Radio Frequency, Communications: 
Gliders can also communicate across the surface of the ocean; however, due to enhance path loss, 
the range to which they can transmit is limited compare to SATCOMs. To determine the range of 
communications, we use the equation 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]r t t r LP P G G P= + + −  (56) 
where 10[ ] 10logP P= , [ ]rP  is received power (in dB referenced to milliwatt), [ ]tP  is 
transmitted power, [ ]tG  is transmitter antenna gain, [ ]rG  is receiver antenna gain and [ ]LP  is 
path loss. The path loss of an electromagnetic wave over a surface is significantly greater than that 
to a satellite. For transmission over a smooth surface 
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1 2
L
dP
h h
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⋅⎝ ⎠
 (57) 
where 1h  and 2h  are the heights of the receiver and transmitter antennas. Note, path loss varies 
with the fourth power of distance and as the height of an antenna goes to zero, this loss become 
infinite. These two effects, significantly limit the ability for communications to occur over the 
surface of the ocean. For [ ] 95dBmrP = − , [ ] 0dBtG = , [ ] 0dBrG = , and 1 2 2mh h= = , we can 
obtain an estimate of the range of an over-the-horizon RF communication system. Here, we also 
include an additional 10 dB increase in the path loss to account for the effects of a rough ocean. 
Figure 22 shows a plot of range versus transmitter power under these assumptions. Notice that 2 
W will transmit up to 1 nm. This is much less than the 758 km (410 nm) range of a SATCOM 
system. 
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Figure 22: Communication range between gliders for a network of gliders using over the surface RF 
transmission. 
Acoustic Communications, ACOMS: 
Calculations similar to those made for SATCOM and RF could be made for ACOMS. However, 
the details of these calculations are more subjected to error due to the nature of the problem, 
therefore, we rely upon the work of Catipovic5 and Baggeroer6 as to the capability of such a 
system. From this work we can expect an ACOMS system operating in the littorals to have ranges 
up to 5 nm, sources transmitting on the order of 100 watts, frequencies between 10 to 100 kHz, 
and bit rates on the order of 100 bps. Notice that these powers and speeds are much higher and 
slower than those for a SATCOM or RF systems (requiring less than 10 watts of power and having 
bit rates on the order of 1 kbps). Nevertheless, just because they use less power to transmit and 
have faster bit rates does not imply they are better systems since RF and SATCOMS can only be 
used on the surface and energy must be expended to reach this position.  
As stated above, we expect that over 1400 bits of data will need to be transmitted during each 
transmission7. Using an ACOMS system this will require about 15 seconds of transmit time and 
about 1400 J of energy. With an RF or SATCOM system this will require only 0.7 seconds of 
transmit time and about 1.4 J of energy. However, this is not all the energy or time that would be 
required to use RF or SATCOM since the glider must come to the surface in order to transmit. The 
difference between the above two energies is about 1398 J. Assuming that each system is allotted 
the same amount of energy to transmit a message, this would be the amount of energy available for 
the glider to reach the surface in the RF or SATCOM system. If one assumes an average glider 
depth of 100 m, then the average force required to bring a glider to the surface expending this 
excess amount of energy would be 14.0 N, and, assuming a drag coefficient of about 0.5 and a 
drag area of 1 sq. m, the average speed of this glider would be about  
                                                     
5 J.A. Catipovic, Performance Limitations in Underwater Acoustic Telemetry, IEEE Journal of Oceanic 
Engineering, vol. 15, no. 3, 1990. 
6 A.B. Baggeroer, Acoustic Telemetry – An Overview, IEEE Journal of Ocean Engineering, vol. OE-9, no. 
4, 1984. 
7 From the August report this would include the information vector and matrix for a three dimensional 
problem and additional information on the character of the contact. 
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At this speed, it will take 7 minutes for the glider to reach the surface – a time much longer than 
the transmit time for a single ACOMS transmission. Thus, on average, assuming equal amounts of 
energy for transmission, the time required to transmit an ACOMS signal is significantly less than 
that for a RF or SATCOM system.  
Nevertheless, as was discussed in the text, even an hour latency delay does little to the 
performance of the swarm. A summary of communication benefits and limitations are given in the 
below table. 
System SATCOM 
1.6 GHz (L band transmission), 100% 
coverage with ~ 2 W, kbps bit rates. 
RF 
900 MHz transmission 
frequencies. Low power ~ 
2 W, kbps bit rates. 
ACOMS 
10 to 100 kHz transmission 
frequencies. 100 W or 
more power levels, 100’s 
of bps bits rates. 
Benefits: o Ability to contact any surfaced glider 
and transmit out of network. 
o Ability to construct a central processing 
station to store data, process and 
transmit at a latter time. 
o Proven commercial system. 
o Limited to nearest 
neighborhood 
communications. 
o Limited to nearest 
neighborhood 
communications. 
Limitations: o Must surface to communicate requiring 
added power. 
o Not stealth. 
o Dying orbits limit the life of the system 
o Short ranges. 
o Must surface to 
communicate requiring 
added power.  
o Can only communicate with 
other gliders that are 
surfaced.  
o May not be stealth to the 
local threat. Communication 
range is much larger than 
detection range.  
Latency 10s of minutes assuming the same amount 
of energy is used as in an ACOMS system. 
Less than a second assuming that the 
glider is already on the surface. 
10s of minutes assuming the 
same amount of energy is used 
as in an ACOMS system. Less 
than a few seconds assuming 
that the glider is already on the 
surface. 
o 10s of seconds. 
Table 3: Latency of communication. 
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